Summary
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the dual practice of the doctors in Algeria under a three-angle approach. The first mobilizes the theories of labor supply applied to the professionals of health confronted with the existence of two sectors, private and public, among which very often the levels of remuneration per hour are different and where the respective working time can partly be chosen. The complementarity between the two jobs underlies a large extent the labor supply strategies for doctors. The second refers to the doctors’ motivation registers in their choice of a private activity. The third is concerning the strategies of patients referral and the manipulation of waiting lists as means of control or induction of the demand of medical care.
The results of the exploratory survey led on an empirical sample of 60 doctors in dual practice allowed to put forward the sensitivity of doctors to financial incentives in the private sector and the strength of monetary motivations in choosing private activity to the point of sacrificing their time of leisure to be on vacation in a private activity. Both jobs can be linked to an asset portfolio where the first job generate stable but low revenue and the second job is more remunerative on average but more variable. The research for activity by doctors in dual practice passes through two action levers : the marking of the therapeutic routes of the patients and the manipulation of the waiting lists for inducing or controlling medical care demand in the sense of their personal interests. The public hospital is then a source of recruitment for the private sector.